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Report an Incident (Maritime Accident/Incident)

Gama

AVÔ MELRO - Very Serious Maritime Casualty

Vessel: AVÔ MELRO

GAMA reference: 2016-059

Data da ocorrência acidental: 04-04-2016

Circulated on: 02-02-2017

Published on: 04-01-2024

Casualty Event: Grounding

Summary

 

On 1 April 2016, the coastal fishing vessel AVÔ MELRO departed Baleeira fishing harbour, Sagres, with six crew members for a gillnet fishing voyage. After several periods of intensive fishing activity, the Master decided at approximately 0200 on 4 April to proceed to the next fishing ground, about two hours away.

The Master instructed the remaining crew members to rest and remained alone on the bridge. The vessel proceeded at 6 knots on a course of 030 degrees under autopilot. The radar alarm, a mobile-phone alarm and a dead-man alarm set to sound every seven minutes were active. During the passage, the Master fell asleep.

At approximately 0610, a crew member woke the Master after AVÔ MELRO had grounded on rocks at low tide. The Maritime Command Centre was alerted and a Portuguese Air Force EH101 helicopter was sent to the casualty site. At approximately 0740, all six crew members were evacuated without injury. All were wearing lifejackets at the time of the evacuation.

The condition of the vessel deteriorated while exposed to the sea. Cracking of the hull made the planned tow to Portimão unsafe. The vessel was declared a total loss and was subsequently dismantled into smaller sections for removal and recycling.

 

Safety recommendations

 

No safety recommendations were issued because the owner and Master had already implemented the practice of assigning a lookout on the bridge during navigation.

 

ACTION TAKEN

The Master had implemented the use of a bridge lookout during navigation periods.

Lessons learned

 

Navigation aids, autopilot and bridge equipment alarms do not replace an alert navigational watch or an independent lookout. During passages between fishing operations, particularly after demanding periods of work, the person responsible for navigation should be supported by a lookout. Where adequate watchkeeping cannot be maintained because of fatigue, the vessel should, when conditions permit, anchor for a sufficient period to allow effective rest before continuing the passage.