On 29 November 2025, while searching at night for fishing-gear marker buoys off Sines, the skipper of the coastal fishing vessel TRAJANO was alone in the wheelhouse, simultaneously responsible for steering, navigation, lookout, operating a portable searchlight and monitoring the propulsion system. A wave struck the vessel on the starboard side, causing the skipper to lose his balance, strike his head against a bulkhead and temporarily lose consciousness. The vessel continued with the engine engaged ahead and without anyone at the controls until it grounded on Areão Beach. All seven crew members abandoned the vessel without assistance and reached the shore. They were subsequently taken to hospital with signs of hypothermia. There were no serious injuries or pollution, but the vessel was declared a constructive total loss.
SR01-2025/411,
DGRM:
Assess the feasibility of introducing specific guidance for identifyingcontrolling risks associated with fishing-vessel operations that depend on a single operator for critical navigationsteering functions.
SR02-2025/411
DGRM:
Assess the applicability of operator-incapacity detection systems, such as dead man alarmsequivalent systems, on coastal fishing vessels.
SR03-2025/411,
DGRM:
Assess ways of promoting procedures within the fishing sector that ensure human redundancy during navigation close to the coast, identification of fishing gearother tasks imposing a high workload on the operator.
SR04-2025/411,
APMSHM:
Assess the development of awareness material concerning sudden operator incapacity, workload management, shared situational awarenessrecovery degraded situations.
Normal operation should not rely exclusively on a single operator for steering, navigation, lookout, propulsion monitoring and safety. The presence of several persons on board does not ensure functional redundancy. Any sudden incapacitation of the operator should be capable of being detected and compensated for. Navigation close to the coast and searching for fishing gear require additional monitoring. Inactivity alarms, propulsion cut-off systems, a second person on the bridge and recovery procedures should be assessed as safety barriers.
