DOURO QUEEN - Less Serious Maritime Casualty

Vessel: DOURO QUEEN CLÁUDIA MAIA

GAMA reference: 2013-054

Data da ocorrência acidental: 25-04-2013

Circulated on: 04-05-2014

Published on: 05-06-2014

Casualty Event: Collision - Ship not underway

Summary

 

On 25 April 2013, DOURO QUEEN was proceeding upstream on the River Douro from Gaia to Régua with 99 passengers and 27 crew members aboard. Near kilometre 48, the electronic control system for the two Veth Z-Drive azimuthing propulsors stopped responding while the vessel was making approximately 7.7 to 7.8 knots. The Master attempted to reset the system, stopped the engines and deployed the stern and bow anchors, but the available distance was insufficient to arrest the vessel. DOURO QUEEN collided with the moored vessels CLAUDIA and MAIA, parting their moorings and setting them adrift. The collision and deployed anchors stopped DOURO QUEEN. No injuries were reported. [54-2013_DouroQueen | PDF]

 

 

Safety recommendations

 

SR 54-2013.1: Assess implementing transit planning and timetable arrangements that ensure a safe speed throughout the River Douro inland waterways, allowing the vessel to stop within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. No response status is recorded in the report.
SR 54-2013.2: Assess installing an engine-room alarm indicating failure of bridge control of the Veth Z-Drive propulsors and the need for immediate transfer to emergency control in the machinery space. No response status is recorded in the report.
SR 54-2013.3: Assess implementing regular training for steering-control failures to minimise the time required to transfer to emergency steering and strengthen coordination between the Master and engineer. No response status is recorded in the report.
SR 54-2013.4: Assess providing vessels fitted with one or more Veth Z-Drive propulsors, particularly those operating in restricted waters or with confined machinery spaces, with a single dedicated emergency-control station from which one operator can control all propulsors without moving between units or using improvised tools. No response status is recorded in the report.

 

 

Lessons learned

 

In restricted inland waters, safe speed should preserve sufficient time and distance to stop following loss of propulsion or directional control. Emergency steering arrangements should provide an immediate and unambiguous alarm, practical access to the controls and the ability to control all relevant propulsors without delay. Regular bridge-engine-room drills should develop a rapid and coordinated response to failures that cannot be resolved by resetting the normal control system.